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Stanford University
Graduate School of Business
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CURRENT EMPLOYMENT

2020 – present   Postdoctoral Scholar, Stanford Graduate School of Business

EDUCATION & VISITING POSITIONS

2015 – 2020   Ph.D. in Economics, Toulouse School of Economics

2013 – 2014   M.Sc. Econometrics and Mathematical Economics, Toulouse School of Economics, Honors

2011 – 2012   M.Sc. Economics, Tilburg University, summa cum laude

2008 – 2011   B.Sc. Economics, Warsaw School of Economics

Spring 2019   Visiting Researcher at Questrom School of Business, Boston University

REFERENCES

Susan Athey

Professor Stanford University

athey@stanford.edu

Dean Karlan

Professor Northwestern University

karlan@kellogg.northwestern.edu

Patrick Rey

Professor Toulouse School of Economics

patrick.rey@tse-fr.eu

Marc Ivaldi

Professor Toulouse School of Economics

marc.ivaldi@tse-fr.eu

RESEARCH FIELDS

Primary fields: Economics of Digitization, Industrial Organization, Causal Inference.
Secondary fields: Competition Policy, Applied Microeconomics.

TEACHING

- 2022: Data Driven Impact, Prof. Susan Athey
- 2016/17, 2017/18, 2018/19: Competition Policy Workshop (graduate), Toulouse School of Economics, Prof. Patrick Rey, Bruno Jullien

- Spring 2016: Applied Econometrics (graduate), Toulouse School of Economics, Prof. Francois Poinas
- Spring 2016: Econometrics (undergraduate), Toulouse School of Economics, Prof. Thierry Magnac

JOB MARKET PAPER

1. Effective and scalable programs to facilitate labor market transitions for women in technology, with Susan Athey, 2022

Abstract: We describe the design, implementation, and evaluation of a low-cost and scalable program that supports women in Poland in transitioning into jobs in the information technology sector. This program, called "*Challenges*," helps participants develop portfolios that demonstrate capability for relevant jobs. We conduct two independent evaluations, one focusing on the *Challenges* program and another on a one-to-one mentoring program. We exploit the fact that both programs were oversubscribed to randomize access among applicants and measure the impact of the programs on the probability of finding a job in the technology sector within four months. We estimate that the mentoring program increases the probability of finding a job in technology by 13 percentage points and the *Challenges* program by 9 percentage points. The benefit of *Challenges* can be compared to the program cost of approximately $15 per person. Next, we show that treatment effects vary with individual characteristics, and we estimate gains from optimally assigning applicants across the two programs. We find that optimal assignment increases participants' average probability of finding a job in technology by approximately 13% compared to random assignment. Finally, we analyze the counterfactual impact of expanding the available spots in *Challenges* from 15% to 50% of applicants, while assigning applicants to programs using the proposed targeting rule. Considering the entire applicant pool as the baseline, this generates a 30% increase in technology sector jobs.

PUBLICATIONS

2. Pay-for-delay with settlement externalities, with Matias Pietola, RAND Journal of Economics (forthcoming)

Abstract: Pay-for-delay patent settlements, in which the incumbent patentee pays a potential entrant to withdraw a patent challenge and stay out of the market, cost patients and taxpayers billions of dollars in higher pharmaceutical prices. We show that in markets with one incumbent and several entrants, the possibility of conditioning such settlements on litigation outcomes against other entrants results in the exclusion of all entrants from the market. When conditional contracts are infeasible, the incumbent licenses the patent or fights entry in court: the resulting competition benefiting consumers. Prohibiting all pay-for-delay settlements increases litigation and may harm consumers by reducing licensing.

3. **Sharing when stranger equals danger: ridesharing during COVID-19 pandemic,** with Marc Ivaldi, Covid Economics 2020

Abstract: Using data collected from one of the most popular ridesharing platforms, we illustrate how mobility has changed after the exit from the Covid-19 induced confinement. We measure the impact of the Covid-19 outbreak on the level of mobility and the price of ridesharing. Finally, we show that the pandemic has exacerbated ethnic discrimination. Our results suggest that a decision-maker encouraging the use of ridesharing during the pandemic should account for the impact of the perceived health risks on ridesharing prices and should find ways to ensure fair access.

WORKING PAPERS

4. **Smiles in Profiles: Improving Fairness and Efficiency Using Estimates of Users Preferences in Online Marketplaces,** with Susan Athey, Dean Karlan, and Yuan Yuan, 2022

Abstract: Online platforms often face challenges being both fair (i.e., non-discriminatory) and efficient (i.e., maximizing revenue). Using computer vision algorithms and observational data from a micro-lending marketplace, we find that choices made by borrowers creating online profiles impact both of these objectives. We further support this conclusion with a web-based randomized survey experiment. In the experiment, we create profile images using Generative Adversarial Networks that differ in a specific feature and estimate it's impact on lender demand. We then counterfactually evaluate alternative platform policies and identify particular approaches to influencing the changeable profile photo features that can ameliorate the fairness-efficiency tension.

5. **Personalized Recommendations in EdTech: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial,** with Keshav Agrawal, Susan Athey, and Ayush Kanodia, 2022

Abstract: We study the impact of personalized content recommendations on the usage of an educational app for children. In a randomized controlled trial, we show that the introduction of personalized recommendations increases the consumption of content in the personalized section of the app by approximately 60% and that the overall app usage increases by 14%, compared to the baseline system of stories selected by content editors for all students. The magnitude of individual gains from personalized content increases with the amount of data available about a student and with preferences for niche content: heavy users with long histories of content interactions who prefer niche content benefit more than infrequent, newer users who like popular content. To facilitate the diffusion of personalized recommendation systems, we provide a framework for using offline data to develop such a system.

6. **CAREER: Transfer Learning for Economic Prediction of Labor Sequence Data,** with Keyon Vafa, Tianyu Du, Ayush Kanodia, Susan Athey, David M Blei, 2022

Abstract: Labor economists regularly analyze employment data by fitting predictive models to small, carefully constructed longitudinal survey datasets. Although modern machine learning methods offer promise for such problems, these survey datasets are too small to take advantage of them. In recent years large datasets of online resumes have also become available, providing data about the career trajectories of millions of individuals. However, standard econometric models cannot take advantage of their scale or incorporate them into the analysis of survey data. To this end we develop CAREER, a transformer-based model that uses transfer learning to learn representations of job sequences. CAREER is first fit to large, passively-collected resume data and then fine-tuned to smaller, better-curated datasets for economic inferences. We fit CAREER to a dataset of 24 million job sequences from resumes, and fine-tune its representations on longitudinal survey datasets. We find that CAREER forms accurate predictions of job sequences on three widely-used economics datasets. We further find that CAREER can be used to form good predictions of other downstream variables; incorporating CAREER into a wage model provides better predictions than the econometric models currently in use.

7. **Fighting discrimination with reputation: The case of online platforms,** with Xavier Lambin, 2022

Abstract: This paper shows that reputation systems can mitigate ethnic discrimination by enabling ethnic minority sellers to accrue a high reputation quickly, leading buyers to update their beliefs. Using data from a ridesharing platform, we find that minority drivers with no reviews make 12% less revenue relative to similar nonminority drivers. This disparity gradually shrinks and almost disappears for experienced drivers. To understand the mechanism behind this process, we construct a model of career concerns' of discriminated sellers in the presence of a reputation system. The model's estimates show that minority drivers, who just entered the platform, face overly pessimistic beliefs about the quality of their service. To alter these beliefs, they exert high effort and offer low introductory prices, swiftly boosting their reputation. Counterfactual simulations reveal that the cost of incorrect prior beliefs is high and that the reputation system strictly benefits minority drivers.

8. **Information and price dynamics in online marketplaces,** with Rossi Abi-Rafeh, 2022

Abstract: We study the entry and pricing decisions of sellers in a market with a reputation system. First, we present a puzzling empirical observation: in rich observational data from two major online marketplaces, the number of reviews and prices are negatively correlated. This finding is robust to a rich set of controls. However, studying a within sellers price variation, we show that sellers gradually increase their prices. Second, we provide a model of pricing and entry with heterogeneity in marginal and opportunity costs and individual reputation as a state variable. We show that new sellers are generally less likely to reenter the platform than incumbents and sellers who

have a lower chance of entering in subsequent periods set on average higher prices. Finally, we counter-factually decrease the reputation state of incumbent sellers and estimate how much they would need to be compensated for the loss of their reputation signals.

AWARDS & GRANTS

- Best paper award, Workshop on Digitization, Telecom ParisTech, May 2018
- AdC Award 2018 for the best unpublished paper on competition economics, October 2018
- Digital Center Scholarship, Toulouse School of Economics, 2019 – 2020
- Mobility Grant, Toulouse School of Economics, Spring 2019
- Fondation Jean Jacques Laffont Scholarship from the European Research Council, 2018 – 2019
- Fondation Jean Jacques Laffont Scholarship from the European Research Council, 2017 – 2018
- Toulouse School of Economics Doctoral Scholarship, 2014 – 2017

PRESENTATIONS AT CONFERENCES

- 2022: European Winter Meeting of the Econometric Society (scheduled), UCSF Economics (scheduled); Digital Economy Lab Stanford University (scheduled); MIT IDE Lunch Seminar; INFORMS Indianapolis; GCSI Lab Seminar Stanford University.

- 2020: Louvain Economics of Digitization Online Seminar; University of Vienna; University of Munich (LMU); ZEW, University of Düsseldorf (DICE); NOVA School of Business & Economics; HEC Montreal.

- 2019: EARIE 2019, Barcelona; 7th WIPE, Reus; IIOC (rising star session), Boston; Columbia Business School (Applied Micro seminar); Boston University (Technology Policy Research Initiative seminar); Questrom School of Business (Strategy & Innovation seminar).

- 2018: 11th Digital Economics Conference, Toulouse; IIOC, Indianapolis; 2nd Doctoral Workshop on Digitization, Paris; CRESSE, Heraklion; EARIE 2018, Athens; 33rd Jornadas de Economia Industrial, Barcelona.

- 2017: ENTER Seminar, Mannheim; CRESSE, Heraklion; EARIE (rising star session), Maastricht.

- 2016: Workshop in Economics of Innovation, Complexity and Knowledge, Turin.

REFEREE SERVICE

Review of Industrial Organization, European Economic Review, Research Policy, Games and Economic Behaviour, Information Economics and Policy.

NON-ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE

- PwC, Associate in Financial Services Consulting Team, 2012 - 2014

- McKinsey&Company, Student Support Research&Information Team, 2012

SOFTWARE

R, Python, STATA, LaTeX

LANGUAGES

Polish (native), English (fluent), French (intermediate)